The Politics that Purges Make: Legacies of Authoritarian Politics in Democratic Brazil

Daniel Hidalgo, MIT
Monday, October 16, 2017 -
12:00pm to 1:30pm
216 Aaron Burr Hall
Monday, October 16, 2017 -
12:00pm to 1:30pm

Authoritarian regimes with elected legislatures often use purges and exile to ensure that political elites remain compliant while the autocrats are in power, as well as to benefit favored elites during democratic transitions. To what extent can autocrats shape the distribution of power among  post-transition political elites? To answer this question, I rely on previously untapped data on from newly opened archives on the military dictatorship in Brazil. This data provides for a highly detailed understanding of the decision-making within the authoritarian regime and forms the basis of a research design for comparing the political trajectories of purged and unpurged politicians before and after the regime transition. 

F. Daniel Hidalgo is the Cecil and Ida Green Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his doctorate in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley and received a BA at Princeton University. Hidalgo is a past recipient of grants from the National Science Foundation, the Fulbright program, and the Experiments in Governance and Politics Network. His research focuses on the political economy of elections, campaigns, and representation in developing democracies, especially in Latin America, as well as quantitative methods in the social sciences. His work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Politics, Review of Economic and Statistics and the American Journal of Political Science. His working paper “Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate Through Clientelism” (with Simeon Nichter) received the Kellogg-Notre Dame Award for best paper in comparative politics.

Sponsored by
Project on Democracy and Development/Comparative Politics